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Abstract: Early work in discursive psychology highlighted the rhetorical
strength of devices that serve to establish matters as objective facts. More
recently, there has been increasing interest within this discipline concerning
mental state invocations (e.g. imagining; knowing; intending), which typically
convey speaker subjectivity. Elsewhere, linguists have examined the social
business enabled by speakers’ deployment of cognitive verbs, a prime example
of which deals with overt references to thinking. The current article sets out to
extend the work on thinking by synthesizing research from discursive psychol-
ogy, linguistics, and conversation analysis in order to undertake an integrated
analysis of thinking. In our examination of a UK talk radio corpus, comprising
data from 11 talk radio shows, we demonstrate three discursive functions of
deploying a thinking device: setting an intersubjective agenda; doing opinion;
and managing ‘facts’. An integrated approach allows us to examine the rhet-
orical strength of these subjectivizing maneuvers, and contribute to the exist-
ing body of work concerning the discursive deployment of thinking and mental
state terms.
Keywords: discourse, subjectivity, thinking, rhetoric, talk radio, cognitive verbs
1 Introduction
The aim of the current study is to extend existing work on thinking by examining
how people make use of thinking as a rhetorical device in the practical accom-
plishment of subjectivity. Our analysis favors a Discursive Psychology (DP) per-
spective, but seeks to synthesize prior DP/Conversation Analytic (CA) work
alongside linguistic research in the area. Our hope is that this integrated approach
offers further insight regarding the variable use of thinking as a speaker resource,
which will be of cross-disciplinary interest.
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We have chosen to focus our analysis of the thinking device within the
interactional context of talk radio. TR is argued to ‘potentially represent the
closest thing to an authentically democratic public sphere that the mass media
have been able to produce’ (Hutchby 2001: 481), within which radio phone-in
programmes function at the juncture of media and public talk (Fitzgerald and
Housley 2002). Nuyts (2001) argues that I think is especially common in antag-
onistic contexts. According to Hutchby (1996), TR operates as a site for engaging
in oppositional debate and, in this context, callers participate with an awareness
that their contribution is more likely to be met with positive or negative evalua-
tion than to be met with neutrality. For this reason, we anticipate that TR will
provide a fruitful site for examining the rhetorical engagement of I think and the
thinking device in general.
The analysis undertakes an inductive exploration of speakers’ deployment
of the thinking device in TR. Taking as our start point the fundamental CA
research question: ‘why that now’ (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 299), our primary
research questions ask (i) what interactional business might be being accom-
plished and (ii) what rhetorical consequences might follow from speaker utiliza-
tion of the thinking device within the TR context.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews previous work on the
thinking device from the fields of DP, CA and linguistics, highlighting its function-
ing as a marker of commitment. This leads to an examination of some of the
relevant ways that objectivity and subjectivity are managed in talk. Section 3
provides details about the data corpus of this research, while Section 4 comprises
the analysis of the data, focusing on three prevalent functions. In Section 5,
conclusions are drawn regarding the analysis and its contribution to work in
DP, CA and linguistics.
2 Literature review
2.1 Cognitive verbs and linguistic commitment
Linguists have long explored the invocation of cognitions via cognitive verbs (e.g.
believe, assume, think). Inspired by Austin (1946/1970), Urmson (1952) sought to
challenge the common philosophical obsession, as he saw it, with the descriptive
function of verbs, by highlighting a class of ‘parenthetical verbs’ (p. 480), which
are not concerned with description. According to Urmson (1952), these verbs have
been confusing to philosophers because, although they appear to reference some-
thing psychological, they do not. He likens the function of such verbs to
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stage-directions, which serve to ‘help the understanding and assessment of what
is said rather than being a part of what is said’ (p. 496). Urmson’s (1952)
observation has developed into the key linguistic principle of commitment, in
which the speaker makes a public display of an attitude towards their utterance
(De Brabanter and Dendale 2008) and which is commonly taken to be gradable
(e.g. Palmer 1986; Toulmin 1958; Vanderveken 1990).
2.2 I think as a variable marker of commitment
Research from the fields of both Linguistics and CA has traditionally associated
I think with a downgrading function in talk. Within CA, I think is understood to
operate as a marker a dispreference, which is intrinsically tentative or reluctant
(e.g. Atkinson and Drew 1979; Levinson 1983; Nofsinger 1991). For example, in
an early elucidation of the features of dispreferred actions, Atkinson and Drew
(1979: 58) highlight the way that the rejection of an offer is ‘somewhat ‘soft-
ened’ by the inclusion of ‘I don’t think,’’ whilst for Levinson (1983), I think is
heralded as one of the ways that a second pair part is characteristically
mitigated.
Similarly, within linguistics, research has demonstrated the downgrading
function of think, assuming only a minus-commitment application (e.g. Hooper
1975; Jucker 1986). Turnbull and Saxton (1997) explore the facework that epistemic
modals achieve during lay speakers’ refusals to comply with requests. The authors
contend that, in contrast to epistemic modals asserting absolute necessity (e.g. I
know), I think expresses ‘probability by indicating that the laws of rationality
dispose but do not compel the speaker to believe the truth of the state of affairs’
(p. 149). Thus, with respect to preserving face during refusals to comply, I (don’t)
think presents a display of tentativeness and reluctance to refuse.
Subsequently, however, the thinking device has been shown to potentially
both strengthen and weaken speaker commitment. Simon-Vandenbergen (2000)
examines the cognitive verb I think in a comparative analysis of political inter-
views and everyday conversations. She finds a dual-role for the particle as a
marker of commitment, which is differentially distributed between the two
contexts. In the conversational discourse, I think tends to indicate a probabil-
ity-based opinion toward potentially verifiable propositions. Conversely, in her
political data, I think usually precedes opinions and subjective evaluations,
typically accompanied by ‘expressions of epistemic certainty, maximizing devi-
ces and emphasisers’ (p. 54), which display strong commitment in potentially
controversial matters that lack objective certitude. Notwithstanding this empiri-
cal distinction, Simon-Vandenbergen notes a common feature of I think across
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the two contexts – that it invariably communicates a speaker’s personal per-
spective. Nuyts (2001: 390) agrees with such a conclusion, asserting more
broadly that ‘mental state predicates systematically express subjectivity.’
Fetzer (2008, 2011) also applies the concept of commitment to the use of the
cognitive verb think in political discourse. In line with Simon-Vandenbergen
(2000), Fetzer (2011: 265) argues that, when it co-occurs with ‘markers of epis-
temic modality expressing probability and possibility, I think has an attenuating
function, and with markers expressing certainty and necessity, it has a boosting
function.’ These findings highlight a contextual dimension to the use of I think.
In particular, Simon-Vandenbergen (2000) argues that casual conversation’s
typical emphasis on agreement contrasts with the adversarial manner by
which interviewers conventionally task interviewees to respond to opposing
views. This perspective aligns with Nuyts (2001), who finds that mental state
predicates predominate in contexts characterised by personal opinions and
overtly individual experiences and/or in argumentative or antagonistic contexts.
2.3 Subjectivizing maneuvers and objective evaluations
In the field of DP, cognitions are examined as they are produced and engaged
with in talk-in-interaction (Edwards and Potter 2005), whilst remaining agnostic
regarding inner cognitive activity (see Antaki 2006). This work concerns itself
with the practical social business accomplished when people make use of
mental state terms (Antaki 2006). Examples include, invocations of (not) remem-
bering (Muntigl and Tim Choi 2010); imagining (e.g. Guise et al. 2007); (not)
wanting, (not) knowing, and intending (Edwards 2006). In each of these exam-
ples, emphasis is placed on speaker deployment of subjectivity, whereby human
agency becomes the overt focus of the talk. In this article, we refer to such
activity as subjectivizing maneuvers as, in line with a DP approach, we are
concerned solely with the practical accomplishments that stem from doing
subjectivity in talk, while making no claims regarding what may or may not
be the ‘inner’ subjective experience of the speaker.
DP work on fact construction evidences the rhetorical strength of devices that
establish matters as objective facts (e.g. Edwards and Potter 1992; Potter 1996;
Xenitidou and Morasso 2014). To frame something as a fact is to make it ‘appear
solid, neutral, independent of the speaker, and to be merely mirroring some
aspect of the world’ (Potter 1996: 1). This representation dissociates the described
matter from human error and the speaker’s own stake or interest (Edwards and
Potter 1992). In analysis of food evaluations in family mealtime conversations,
Wiggins and Potter (2003) focus on the contrast between subjectivizing versus
4 Ava D. Horowitz and Laura Kilby
Brought to you by | Sheffield Hallam University
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/1/19 11:37 AM
objectivizing activity. These authors distinguish subjective evaluations as occa-
sions where the subject is grammatically foregrounded, such that their food
(dis)preferences are the focus of the utterance. Meanwhile, in objective evalua-
tions, the object is grammatically foregrounded, such that the utterance focuses
on the qualities of the food itself. Wiggins and Potter’s comparative analysis
highlights a number of rhetorical advantages of each evaluation type, in partic-
ular, the way that these evaluations differentially manage their implications for
others. For example, by focusing on the author, subjective evaluations avoid
implicating others as sharing the evaluation. This can be useful for protecting
hearers’ negative face (see Brown and Levinson 1987). Conversely, in the case of
complimenting an object’s (food item’s) creator, an objective evaluation praises
that object’s qualities, implying that anyone evaluating the object would likely
(also) do so positively. Such contrasts highlight the unique affordances offered by
subjectivizing maneuvers, which is the focus of the present article.
3 Data and methodology
Our data comprise a corpus of 11 TR shows broadcast live by BBC Radio 5 between
January and April 2013. These shows featured within the regular Your Call weekday
morning slot, which traditionally involved live debate of a preselected, often
contentious, current affairs topic. Members of the public called in and contributed
their views alongside input from pre-invited elite callers, judged to have some
relevant knowledge or expertise. The 11 shows were selected from a larger corpus,
collected daily over a four month period. The selection was based solely upon the
show titles to ensure the inclusion of wide ranging topics that were considered
likely to generate input from diverse callers. In total, the dataset of 11 shows
comprise 10,228 lines of transcript (see the Appendix for transcription conventions).
Across the dataset, think is stated on a total of 708 occasions. The minimum
instances of think in any given episode is 33 and the maximum is 105, (Mean = 64).
4 Analysis
In keeping with the findings of Fetzer (2008), think was by far the most frequent
cognitive verb in our data. Across the dataset we identified frequencies of the
following cognitive verbs (also referred to as weak assertives [Hooper 1975] or para-
ntheticals [Urmson 1952]): think = 708; believe/ief = 79; expect = 22; suppose = 26;
imagine = 10; guess = 4. The thinking device, which includes think(ing)/thought,
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featured across the contributions made by both the host and callers within all of the
programmes analyzed. The analysis below distinguishes three functions of the
thinking device that were found to predominate in our data: setting an intersubjective
agenda; doing opinion; and managing facts.
4.1 Setting an intersubjective agenda
One of the most common ways in which formulations of thinking appeared in the
data involved its invocation by the show’s host, as part of their recurrent, omni-
relevant institutional activity (Kilby and Horowitz 2013). The first example of this
occurs within the standard host activity of sending out to the audience an initial
call or routine reminder of the show’s topic. These featured the thinking device in
eight of the 11 shows, for example:
(1) [Show F: host-think].
1 NC >we want< your thoughts oh five hundred >nine oh nine<
2 ↓six nine thre::e
(2) [Show E: host-think].
1 NC what do you think should tax payers stump up so
2 parents can (.) stay at home
In addition to such topic initiation work, a regular host’s deployment of thinking
featured within a second omni-relevant host activity: introducing or reintroduc-
ing callers to the air (Thornborrow 2001). At least one example of this use of
thinking appeared in each of the 11 shows and tended to take the open-ended
format of what do you think.
(3) [Show C: host-think].
1 NC Well let’s hear from ↑A::ngela in ox er
2 Angela in Oxfordshire Angela what d’you ↓think (.)
Less frequently, the thinking device featured when hosts posed questions to callers
currently onair. These tended to take the fixed-response formatofdoyou think (that) x.
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(4) [Show K: host-think].
1 RB do you think it is a uniquely (0.2) English trait
2 this ↑arrogance?
The majority of these shows explicitly target evaluative concerns linked to
contemporary social issues in the UK. For example, one show debated Should
the army be recruiting 16 year olds? at a time when international campaign
groups were petitioning the British Army to end the recruitment of people
under the age of eighteen; and Should the NHS give IVF to women in their
40’s? was debated in the wake of a change in NHS guidelines on this issue.
The hosts’ variable and repeated usage of the thinking device during call open-
ings serves to focus the business of these shows on the subjectivity of what
people think. This creates a space in which perspectives on, and evaluations of,
the issue at hand can, should and do differ. Competing thoughts invoke an
intersubjective atmosphere in which multiplicities of evaluations provide for the
entertainment of listeners.
In our analysis, the thinking device provides a mechanism for setting an
intersubjective agenda for these shows, such that intersubjective, and often
competing, views and opinions become the focus. As Fetzer (2008: 386)
argues, as soon as a speaker communicates a subjective world stance it ‘is
no longer part of the subjective world but assigned an intersubjective status.’
We use the term ‘intersubjective’ here to incorporate both what Billig (1989)
distinguishes by this term – the assumption that viewpoints toward a referent
should be coherent with/substitutable for each other – and the alternative
assumption, which he calls multisubjectivity – that numerous, potentially con-
tradictory, viewpoints toward a referent can coexist. Billig argues that even
holders of strong views may take a multisubjective stance at some points (e.g.
when distinguishing their views from counterviews). In the sequential run of
TR, where the host oversees progression of the debate from caller to caller, the
intersubjective agenda provided by the host’s use of the thinking device allows
for callers to adopt either an intersubjective or a multisubjective stance as
appropriate to their rhetorical purposes.
4.2 Doing opinion
We turn now to caller invocations of the thinking device, to illustrate a series of
ways in which it is deployed so as to construct opinion, stance or perspective. In
the first instance, we examine caller invocations of I think in the accomplishment
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of evaluations. As previously noted, CA demonstrates the work that I think
accomplishes as a marker of dispreference (e.g. Atkinson and Drew 1979;
Levinson 1983; Nofsinger 1991). In the current data, there were many examples
of I think appearing, on first glance, as just such a dispreference marker within
second pair parts.
(5) [Show K: caller-think].
1 RB e:rm so Mark ↑are the English ↓arrogant
2 Ma2 (0.4) well (0.4) ↑I think some some that-
3 clearly some English people are arrogant
4 but but a- w- a- for the ↑most ↓part y’know ↑I ↓think that
5 ↑other nations have .hh um >y’know<
6 a a quite a justified inferi↑ori↓ty complex
7 and they’re ↑all ↓ready ↑all too ↓ready to take offense
8 and ↑call ↓English people arrogant
Extract 5 is typical of such occurrences, whereby I think occurs within a ques-
tion-answer sequence, in combination with various other dispreference markers,
including delays, repair initiations (some some that- clearly some [lines 2–3]),
prefaces (well [line 2]) and token agreements (some English people are arrogant
but [lines 3–4]). In such cases, in keeping with the findings of Turnbull and
Saxton (1997), the thinking device works to maintain face. In Extract 5, I think
confines the evaluation – some some that- clearly some English people are
arrogant (lines 2–3) – to only what the speaker thinks, thus foregrounding the
speaker’s subjectivity.
In her analysis of political interview data, Simon-Vandenbergen (1997)
reports similar hedges, whereby I think is combined with analogous items.
Such utterances are also typical of what Fetzer (2008) characterises as a minus-
commitment usage of I think. Far more prevalent, however, in the current data,
was the contrasting deployment of I think identified by both Simon-
Vandenbergen (1997, 2000) and Fetzer (2008, 2011): the plus-commitment
usage. Simon-Vandenbergen (1997) notes the way that I think tends to be
repeatedly combined with high value choices by political speakers, displaying
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a very strong commitment to their own thesis. CA’s extensive attention to high
value choices follows their characterisation by Pomerantz (1986) as extreme
case formulations (ECFs). In our data, I think was recurrently combined with
ECFs, which serves to upgrade commitment in the way Simon-Vandenbergen
(1997, 2000) observes. Here are two examples:
(6) [Show C: caller-think].
1 Ma .hh erm well I I ↑tuned in act↓ually
2 as I was driving along Nicky
3 [and I was just °real-°
4 NC [↑thank ↓you (.) [((laughs))]
5 Ma [it’s o↑ka::y I was ↑ab::solutely app↓a::lled .hh
6 at the way Holly Dustin was spoken to:
7 and I think .hh she is just a perfect illustration .hh
8 of how when women ↑start to speak ↓out
9 about what’s ↑happening to them .hh
10 NC [yeah]
11 Ma [they get ↑si↓lenced hh and what they’re saying
12 is actually often minimised and so
13 from a discussion about groping we suddenly
14 found ourselves having a discussion about wolf whistling
15 NC [Yes]
16 Ma [and the who::le discussion got taken away
17 and I think it’s just hh a typical wa::y hh that
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18 when women and girls try and speak about
19 out about these things hh that we’re silenced hh
20 so we we don’t try again
(7) [Show D: caller-think].
1 Su hall↑o: how are ↓you
2 NC very well thank you it’s all you::rs
3 Su Right erm I hhmm personally
4 I think it’s an abomination hh as far as I’::m aware
5 and I’m not a biologist o::r anybody like that erm hh
6 we have sex (.) partly because its enjoyable hh
7 but also because we it::s for procreation
8 NC [Oh right]
9 Su [to continue the species hh
10 er::m (.) and as I see that er::m the human (.) race
11 at the moment is not exactly going to
12 become extinct overnight hh I don’t see that there’s
13 a need to try and save every single embryo hh
14 an::d sort of produce a child from it erm
15 I also think that not every woman is designed or or
16 intended in the great scheme of things to have a child
10 Ava D. Horowitz and Laura Kilby
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In these extracts, the initial think-ECF pairings toward the start of each turn, I
think .hh she is just a perfect illustration (Extract 6, line 7); I think it’s an abomi-
nation (Extract 7, line 4), convey a speaker’s extreme subjective evaluation.
Building on Pomerantz’s (1986) work, subsequent research has demonstrated
the potential for ECFs to function as displays of speaker investment (Edwards
2000; Norrick 2004). Moreover, Edwards (2000) notes that an important feature of
ECFs is that they are regularly treated as ‘hearably nonliteral… that is, offered and
received as something other than accountably accurate proposals about the
world’ (p. 369). In discussing the potential ambiguity of private verbs, Simon
Vandenbergen outlines the position of Stubbs (1986), who proposes that a modal
meaning will be inferred when I think is followed by a verifiable proposition,
whilst, when it is followed by an unverifiable proposition, a psychological mean-
ing will be inferred. However, based upon her analysis, Simon-Vandenbergen
(2000: 52) reports that, although there are instances where I think is followed by
either a verifiable or non-verifiable proposition, there are also ‘many cases where
the distinction between verifiable and non-verifiable is not clear-cut because the
proposition refers partly to a probable fact and partly to personal opinion.’
Moreover, in her political interview data, the propositions related to I think are
typically ‘‘pure opinion’ and ‘subjective evaluation’’ (p. 52). She suggests that
such use serves the speaker’s desire to appear committed and self-assured when
talking about controversial issues that are far from certain.
In our analysis of TR data, we similarly found both verifiable and non-
verifiable propositions linked to the thinking device. However, by far the most
common use of the thinking device was related to non-verifiable propositions,
whereby lay and elite speakers display plus-commitment to an intersubjective
psychological position in a similar way to that of the elite speakers in Simon-
Vandenbergen’s (2000) political interview corpus. In his detailed work on rhet-
oric, Billig (1996) states that building advocacy for one’s position is a central
rhetorical activity, which draws upon a range of strategies designed to develop
and uphold a given stance, and that the issue of consistency is key. In Extracts 6
and 7 the think-ECF pairing occurs toward the start of the speaker’s turn, thereby
providing an unambiguous moral starting point upon which additional advo-
cacy work can rest. In both of these Extracts we see such advocacy swiftly
develop, with a second use of the thinking device closely following the initial
think-ECF pairing. In Extract 6 this second use might be routinely treated as non-
verifiable (and I think its just hh a typical wa::y hh that when women and girls try
and speak about out about these things hh that we’re silenced [lines 17–19]).
However, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that factual evidence may be
gathered to support the claim. Meanwhile, the subsequent pairing in Extract 7 (I
also think that not every woman is designed or or intended in the great scheme of
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things to have a child [lines 15–16]) is, again, arguably verifiable. However, both
propositions we suggest best align with Simon-Vandenbergen’s (2000) prior
point, namely, that the verifiable qualities of some propositions are, in practice,
not clear cut. From a rhetorical standpoint, such ambiguity regarding the verifi-
able/non-verifiable basis of the proposition is well suited to advancing the
ambitions of the speaker, enabling the speaker to promote an unambiguous
moral position, whilst limiting the possibility of challenge regarding the objec-
tive basis of the supportive claims. In other words, whilst the use of ambiguous,
or indeed, non-verifiable propositions may potentially leave room for doubt
regarding the objective facts which underpin the speaker’s stance; they afford
advocacy through consistency, thereby leaving no room for ambiguity regarding
the speaker’s moral stance in relation to the issue.
Having demonstrated these two examples of an upgrading function to I
think, we now return to further consider Extract 5:
(5) [Show K: caller-think].
1 RB erm so Mark ↑are the English ↓arrogant
2 Ma2 (0.4) well (0.4) ↑I think some some that-
3 clearly some English people are arrogant
4 but but a- w- a- for the ↑most ↓part y’know ↑I ↓think that
5 ↑other nations have .hh um >y’know<
6 a a quite a justified inferi↑ori↓ty complex
7 and they’re ↑all ↓ready ↑all too ↓ready to take offense
8 and ↑call ↓English people arrogant
We have already noted the caller’s inclusion of dispreference markers in Extract 5,
but we can also see here ECFs: clearly (line 3) and ↑all ↓ready ↑all too ↓ready
(line 7). We suggest that here is where a bidirectional potential of I think, in
relation to commitment, supports the rhetorical work of the speaker. Billig (1996)
highlights that speakers often experience situations in which they must strive to
identify with an audience while simultaneously offering a contradictory view-
point, and ‘when this occurs, the contrary forces of accommodation and
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contradictions must be brought into play, and the speaker will have the tricky job
of navigating the waters whose currents swirl about dangerously in several
directions’ (p. 268). In Extract 5, the mix of ECF upgrades and dispreference
downgrades, combined with the two uses of the thinking device, enables the
speaker to firstly concede that English arrogance is possible, via a modal proba-
bility use of think. English arrogance is then set aside as the speaker presents a
more central concern, namely the inferi↑ori↓ty complex (line 6) attributed to other
nations. This second use of think is not open to modal interpretation, instead it
provides a psychological display of speaker subjectivity, presenting a morally
grounded plus-commitment to the proposition.
Simon-Vandenbergen reports that, whilst variable displays of plus and
minus commitment are evident across her political interviews and casual con-
versation data, displays of doubt are more evident in the casual conversation
data. Meanwhile, displays of certainty are a much stronger feature of political
interviews. Interestingly, our analysis reveals similar use of the thinking device
by everyday lay speakers who are calling in to TR, to the elite political speakers
in the data analysed by Simon-Vandenbergen (2000). The above examples
reflect how I think serves to boost these lay speakers’ subjective position, whilst
striving to maintain a relationship with the audience and avoiding impeding the
actions of others if they were to disagree with that position. Moreover, as Simon-
Vandenbergen (2000) notes, I think is always available to be oriented to as a
marker of probability. Thus, the think-ECF pairing can potentially inoculate ECFs
against challenge to their ‘factually brittle’ status (Edwards 2000: 352).
The above observations about the upgrading and downgrading functions of
I think also apply to examples of I don’t think in the data. In the following two
Extracts, I don’t think functions quite straightforwardly in a minus-commitment,
dispreference-marking role.
(8) [Show K: host-think].
1 RB I d- I ↑don’t think that’s absolutely en↑tirely ↓true
2 >but it< ↑might (.) >be< ↓bro:adly speaking
(9) [Show J: caller-think].
1 Ni >I mean< I’ve .hh I’ve got Mediterranean blood in me
2 the the Mediterranean’s do it ↑effortlessly
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3 I don’t know the whys and the wherefores
4 I ↓don’t think we’ve got time to a- analyze why it i:s
5 .hhh e::r maybe there’s a stronger ↑family unit
6 ↓I don’t I- I don’t know the full reasons
Here, I don’t think combines, as Fetzer (2011) observes, with (other) markers of
probability: [not] absolutely en ↑ tirely ↓ true (Extract 8, line 1); ↑ might (.) >be<
(Extract 8, line 2);maybe (Extract 9, line 5); and I don’t know (Extract 9, lines 3 and
6). It also combines with (other) dispreference markers, such as self-repair (I d- I
[Extract 8, line 1], I’ve .hh I’ve [Extract 9, line 1] and the the [Extract 9, line 2]); delay
(e::r [Extract 9, line 5]); and token agreements (it< ↑might (.) >be< ↓bro:adly
speaking [Extract 8, line 2]). Commensurate with the facework Turnbull and
Saxton (1997) report being accomplished in the extensive use of I don’t think in
speaker’s refusals to comply, in Extract 8, line 1, I don’t think softens the host’s
challenge to the veracity of a prior caller’s objectivity claims. Similarly, in Extract 9
line 4, I don’t think softens speaker commitment to an assertion of a time-constraint
impediment to the provision of further information.
However, in our data, we also repeatedly witness I don’t think operating in a
plus-commitment capacity. The presentation of this involves speakers develop-
ing a contrast between what they don’t think and do think in a single turn. In
these cases, what speakers don’t think does not counter what another caller has
argued in favor of; rather speakers present what they don’t think juxtaposed
against what they do think. Below are some examples: Extract 10 is drawn from a
debate concerned with ‘tax payers and stay-at-home parents;’ Extract 11 appears
in a programme addressing concerns around domestic terrorism; and Extract 12
is from a show focusing on an MP and his wife being imprisoned.
(10) [Show E: caller-think].
1 Ia oh isn’t it ↓wonderful that we’ve got a er
2 a school in Peterborough with ↑three hundred children
3 and none of them has got English as a first language
4 hh there’s eleven language ((inaudible)) ↑yep (.) cool.
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5 ↑I don’t think that’s ↓goo:d (.)I think that’s a failure
6 by ↑government
(11) [Show F: caller-think].
1 WZ I- I think we’ve got e- e- g- I- I- I we’ve got
2 ↓scho::ols in ↓Birmingham which are
3 ninety percent >one particular< faith I don’t think that
4 (.) particularly preaches integration wel well
5 I ↓don’t think that supports community cohesion well
6 I think >we need to look at< how we can address that hh
7 I don’t think that hh
8 that creates (.) er er ↑terrorism er ↑terrorists
9 er (.) I ↑think that hh that ha- .hh
10 ↑helps (.) ma::rginalise individuals
11 I think >that’s what we need to< look at
(12) [Show I: caller-think].
1 NC Steve what was it like for you
2 St it was horrendous (.) it really was it was-
3 worst time of my life .hh and I feel really sorry
4 for the ↑pair of them to be honest with ya
5 I don’t think >people like that<
6 should really be sent to ↑prison (.)
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7 I think it’s a complete waste of th::e erm (.)
8 ((inaudible)) cost (.)
Whilst Extract 10 represents a clear-cut example of I don’t think and I think
performing upgrading of the evaluations made, Extracts 11 and 12 contain down-
grades (e.g. particularly (.) preaches [Extract 11, line 4]; should really be [Extract
12, line 6]) and upgrades (e.g. we need to look [Extract 11, line 6]; complete waste
[Extract 12, line 7]). In these cases, the combined use of upgrades and down-
grades again serves the rhetorical effectiveness of the thinking device by pre-
senting a balanced and reasoned assessment, which in turn promotes the
speaker’s subjectivity. In the case of I do-don’t think contrasts, the speaker’s
subjective stance is communicated via the considered and rational articulation
of assertions they are committed to and against.
Having elucidated a number of the ways in which opinions are constructed
in conjunction with a first-person deployment of the thinking device, we now
turn to its third-person usage. The first notable matter is that proposals of what
others think are far less common in our data than uses of I think. Secondly, a
wide range of others are represented as thinking by callers, including you,
somebody, they, people, and various identity designations.
(13) [Show J: caller-think].
1 Ar I must say that I phoned up
2 because I was ↑incensed b::y .hh
3 the lady who spoke just before the break
4 who seemed to think that she could do
5 .hh >anything< she ↑wi:shed irrespective of other ↑people
(14) [Show C: caller-think].
1 An ↑wolf whistling which it which
2 it actually ↓is a compliment
3 NC yeah we-
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4 An it’s a ↑compliment if somebody (0.4)
5 ↑thinks ↓you’re attractive
In these Extracts, callers are using the thinking device to focus their challenge of
another’s perspective by emphasizing the subjectivity of said other. A common
feature of such challenges is the explicit or implicit contrast of the others’
subjectivity with extant reality.
(15) [Show K: caller-think].
1 TE it suits (0.6) smaller countries (0.4)
2 say like Scotland (0.4) >d’you know<
3 to↑think that ↓England are arrogant they’re not arrogant
Extract 16 [Show G: caller-think].
1 KL ↑all I would ↓say .hh is .hh for >anyone< who thinks
2 that ↑violence will be the thing that turns it round
3 it isn’t it im↑mediately ↓moves the debate
4 awa:y away from the ↑issue hh onto one of ↑violence
When Jefferson (2004a) outlines her ‘notes on ‘At first I thought’’ (p. 139), she builds
upon the earlier observations by Sacks (1992, Vol I: 787), in which ‘the contrast class
true-false … turn[s] out to be relevant… for participants’ and often involves the use
of verbs, including think. Expanding these analyses, Jefferson (2004a) identifies a
recurrent conversational sequence, whereby a first speaker states X is the case, a
second speaker tenders an I thought Y counter-statement, following which, the first
speaker makes a denial of Y. The sequences in the Extracts above are somewhat
similar. However, in these cases a single speaker produces all the parts and the
sequence order is: other thinks Y, denial of Y, X is the case. Outlining how her
identified exchanges map onto the At first I thought X, then I realised Y format,
Jefferson (2004a: 145) explicates how ‘‘thought’ is used when it turns out to be
wrong but is being pursued as in-principle correct, reasonable, right’ (original
emphasis). However, the other thinks-reality contrast within the current data is a
more straightforward discounting of the subjectivity of others.
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4.3 Managing facts
A contrasting use of the thinking device in our data relates to situations where I
think is attached to objectively verifiable propositions. We will focus on two
Extracts, one of which discusses concerns about immigration into the UK, and
the other explores attitudes towards providing IVF treatment to women in their
forties. Extract 17 involves the speaker’s use of I think in expressions of
uncertainty.
(17) [Show B: caller-think].
1 Al and ↑then you put >somebody< who’s in↑competent
2 and as parliament put it .hh er Keith Vaz I ↓think
3 the chairman of the home affairs sel↑ect com↓mittee
(18) [Show D: caller-think].
1 Ro she’s only got a ↑yea:r ↓t::o
2 >to potentially have< a ↑ba↓by erm
3 now that >puts a lot< of ↑press↓ure on it and I think
4 er (.) with my ↑limi↓ted understanding of it
5 that actually can (.) contribute to er
6 a negative (.) possi↑bility
In these Extracts, the speaker makes a factual declaration, but attenuates their
pronouncement using I think. This use of I think fits with its common linguistic
treatment, following Halliday (1994: 342), as an ‘epistemic modality of probability.’
Here, we demonstrate qualified support in our data for such a function of I think:
qualified in that this represents just one of a range of ways that I think is deployed. It
should also be noted that such a use of I think is regular (occurring in all 11 shows)
but not very common in the data. Related to our earlier observations, we suggest
that the TR context falls somewhere between the extremes of lay and political
discourses identified by Simon-Vandenbergen (1998, 2000). Simon-Vandenbergen
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finds such ‘‘low value’ of probability’ expressions (2000: 53) to be recurrent in her
conversational data but very infrequent in both her political interview (2000) and
parliamentary debate corpora (1998).
Edwards and Potter’s (1992) work on fact construction suggests that devi-
ces which establish descriptions as being pure reflections of objective reality
are a key solution to stake dilemmas, such that speaker interests are removed.
What we witness in the above usage of I think is that it is possible for
subjectivity to be foregrounded in a way that manages the dilemma of stake.
This usage of I think, rather than indexing an opinion or stance on a proposi-
tion, highlights the tentativeness of the proposition. Thus, far from introducing
an interestedness, it acts as a qualifier that protects against corruption by
inaccuracy. Moreover, buffering a statement of fact in this way projects, for
the speaker, an identity of someone whose central concern is the veracity of
their assertions.
One final point of analysis concerns the usage of I think for the handling of
facts during what can be glossed as concluding. The most common way in which
this was accomplished was in the format so I think.
(19) [Show E: caller-think].
1 Be there are no allowances for the married ↑mother hh
2 but ↑single mothers (0.4) ↑do get
3 allowances for their children (0.4) .hh
4 so ↑I think that it would be a good idea
5 to pay something to ↑married ↓mothers
Drawing on Schiffrin’s (1987: 201–202) proposal that ‘so conveys a meaning of
‘result,’’ Tien Do and Phuc (2012: 298) demonstrate that ‘‘so’ serves to show the
introduction of something as the upshot of speakers’ prior talk … as resulting
from their shared knowledge and/or a result of the activity they are engaged in.’
In the current data, a concluding activity is accomplished via a statement of fact,
followed by so I think, and then an evaluation that is conveyed as the conse-
quence of that fact. A parallel function appears in our data via the format and I
think. According to Schiffrin (1985), and can perform a similar coordinating
function to so when advancing a proposition and this seems to be the case in
examples such as the following:
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(20) [Show I: caller-think].
1 LB they (0.4) play jokes on you hh get- (.)
2 clothes that don’t fit you prison clothes
3 I remember them bit sort of starchy and scratchy .hh
4 but it ↑actual↓ly (.) er for ↑me: >it was
5 ↓no< different from school .hh bit like- (.)
6 >you know< how one was treated at school
7 .hh but that’s the in↑itial shock and I ↑think fo::r (.)
8 e:r (.) ↑Vic↓ky ↑that sort of treatment will be:
9 ↑really quite difficult to deal with
Sometimes, however, no coordinating conjunction is present, yet the structure
and function of the utterance appear otherwise comparable to the uses already
discussed. In these cases, a speaker’s evaluation is presented as the outcome of
the facts they have just pronounced.
(21) [Show H: caller-think].
1 De my father said (0.2) .hh
2 when I left (0.2) e:rm the ↑train station
3 I’ll see you in a couple a weeks (.)
4 I think that gave me- .hh e:r
5 basically the (0.4) will hh to stay in really
In each of these cases, I think appears to subjectivize a proposition that is
presented as an upshot from some pre-stated description of the world. This
observation again expands on previous analyses of fact construction. We witness
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constructions of objective fact adjoined to subjectivized evaluations, such that
speaker subjectivity can be foregrounded while conveying a strict adherence to
the veracity of matters of fact. Again, the dilemma of stake (Edwards and Potter
1992) is managed, not by the complete avoidance of subjectivization but, in this
case, by co-opting fact constructions to bolster subjective evaluations.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In our analysis, the thinking device has been demonstrated to act as a resource
that can perform a range of functions. In the context of TR where speaker
intersubjectivity is of central concern, we find the thinking device to be repeat-
edly involved in the business of opinion-making, and also tied up with the
construction of facts. In our data, the creation of a space for opinions to be
aired is promoted via invocations of thinking by show hosts, while, in producing
opinions, callers draw on the thinking device to build advocacy for their stand-
point. In doing so we witness the flexibility of the thinking device, with the
capacity to both upgrade and downgrade speaker utterances, and operating on
factual assertions in both additive and contrastive ways.
Following previous work that has examined I think in the realms of political
discourse (Fetzer 2008, Fetzer 2011; Simon-Vandenbergen 1997, Simon-
Vandenbergen 2000) and lay talk (Simon-Vandenbergen 2000; Turnbull and
Saxton 1997), our analysis explores TR discourse, a site where multiplicity of
views and the voicing of strong opinion is normative. Simon-Vandenbergen
(2000) argues that, in her data, the tone of speaker turns typically demonstrates
uncertainty in casual conversation, and certainty in political interviews. She
concludes that this is because only the political interviewees are undertaking to
‘show they are in possession of the necessary authority to deserve the trust and
confidence of their listeners or at least part of their listeners’ (p. 58). In the current
analysis, upgrading uses of I think are very common and uncertainty deployments
are less common but regular. One explanation is that these TR callers are less
engaged in projecting an authoritative identity on these shows than the political
figures in Simon-Vandenbergen’s (1997, 1998, 2000) data. Alternatively, projecting
an authoritative identity may have been one of these callers’ central projects but,
compared to Simon-Vandenbergen’s political speakers, these callers may have
been freer to do uncertainty for the purposes of conveying a rational, veracity-
focused identity, whenever the occasion warranted such a move.
In terms of the analytic scope of the current work, our analysis adds to existing
DP work, highlighting that, in addition to the objectivizing work associated with
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fact construction (e.g. Edwards and Potter 1992; Potter 1996; Xenitidou andMorasso
2014), subjectivizingmanouevres are also useful rhetorical tools in the furnishing of
both opinion and fact. Furthermore, related directly to the work by Wiggins and
Potter (2003: 516) on grammatically embedded subjective evaluations – as ‘I (x) the
cheese’, versus objective evaluations ‘The cheese is (x)’ – our analysis reveals an
alternative, conjoined subjective-objective evaluation, ‘I think the cheese is (x).’
This format offers a range of affordances that differ from either of those previously
identified by Wiggins and Potter.
In relation to classic CA work, our analysis has shown numerous upgrading
usages of I think, as well as deployments of I think in conjunction with combined
upgrading and downgrading particles. We have thus argued that the dual-
capacity of I think represents a valuable rhetorical resource for speakers,
which differs from its use as a second pair part marker of dispreference. On a
rather different note, we would also add the contrast of I do-don’t think and of
other thinks-reality to At first I thought X, then I realised Y (Jefferson 2004a), as
examples in which the thinking device is commonly deployed within a contrast
structure in talk-in-interaction.
Whilst adopting a predominantly DP approach, we have sought to synthe-
size our analysis with the existing body of linguistic research. Linguistic
research has taken a keen interest in the study of thinking as a cognitive verb,
and this body of linguistic work has scaffolded our knowledge and our approach
to examining thinking as a rhetorical device. Our findings lend support to the
work of Simon-Vandenbergen (1997, 2000) and Fetzer (2008, 2011) in arguing
against the assumption of a purely probabilistic quality to I think. We did find an
important function for probabilistic deployments of I think, in its uncertainty
usage, and these appear useful for the delicate handling of facts. However, the
current analysis makes clear that the probabilistic deployment of I think is just
one of many functions of the device. We hope that our attempt to synthesize
linguistic and DP approaches to examine thinking in this manner provides useful
insights for researchers in both fields, and that our work might stimulate addi-
tional integrated attempts to study cognitive verbs.
In conclusion, we recognize that the current analysis does not represent an
exhaustive list of potential uses for the thinking device and we suggest that it
merits a great deal more scrutiny. Further work appears warranted across a range
of contexts in order to establish when and how the thinking device gains its
rhetorical power. Moreover, similar investigations of the ways in which speakers
invoke subjectivity-talk such as feeling, believing, guessing, and knowing might
also be highly illuminating. We hope, through this analysis, to have stimulated
interest in synthesizing approaches to the study of subjectivizing maneuvers and
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cast some light on what can be accomplished by foregrounding subjectivity with
the thinking device, in the case of broadcast discourse.
Appendix: Transcript conventions
Based on the Jefferson (2004b) transcription system.
(.) Numbers in brackets indicate elapsed time in seconds
(.) A dot in brackets indicates a hearable pause of under . seconds
can Underlining indicates stressed intonation
[ Opening square bracket indicates the onset of overlapping talk
] Closing square bracket indicates the end of overlapping talk, where
discernable
°real° Degree signs indicate speech volume that is markedly quiet
I- I- Dash indicates abrupt cut-off of sound or word
↑I ↓do Up and down arrows indicate high or low pitch
: Colons indicate extensions of the sound immediately before
. A full-stop indicates a completing inflection, irrespective of sentence
completion
.hh Dot-prefixed h pairs indicate an audible in-breath
hh h pairs indicate an audible out-breath
>be< Greater and lesser than symbols encompass talk at a discernibly
faster speech rate
((words)) Transcriber description is provided in double brackets
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